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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 09-1446
                        
LISA MIRABILE,
            Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-03102)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 17, 2009
Before:  RENDELL, BARRY and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:   December 7, 2009)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Lisa Mirabile appeals from the District Court’s order affirming a final
administrative action of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”).  The
District Court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision that Mirabile was not disabled and
     The District Court opinion misstates the alleged onset date as April 1, 2004.  (Dist.1
Ct. Op. 2.)  
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thus not entitled to disability insurance benefits under Title II or Supplemental Security
Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.  The Commissioner’s decision was
based on the decision of Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) John Farley on December 21,
2006, which found that Mirabile, but for her substance abuse disorder, retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work and so was not
disabled.  Mirabile appeals the District Court’s order on the grounds that the ALJ’s
finding was not supported by substantial evidence.  
The ALJ’s finding was supported by substantial evidence, and so we will affirm.
I.
On October 27, 2004, Mirabile filed a disability benefits claim and an SSI
application, in which she alleged disability due to a bipolar disorder, depression, and a
social anxiety disorder, with an onset date of April 1, 2003.   The Commissioner denied1
the disability benefits claim and the SSI application initially on January 31, 2005, and
upon reconsideration on April 6, 2005.  Mirabile then requested a hearing before an ALJ. 
A hearing was held before ALJ Farley on August 2, 2006.  ALJ Farley concluded that
Mirabile was not disabled because he found that but for her substance abuse disorder, she
retained the RFC to perform her past relevant work as a motorcycle salesperson, a job she
had held from 1992 to 1999.  The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final
3decision on May 5, 2007, when the Appeals Council denied Mirabile’s request for review
of the ALJ’s decision.  
II.
An individual may obtain review in federal district court of the Commissioner’s
final decision if the decision was made after a hearing to which the individual was a
party.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over the ALJ’s application of the law, and review the ALJ’s
findings of fact to determine if they are supported by “substantial evidence.”  Poulos v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007).  “Substantial evidence” need not be
a preponderance of the evidence, but it must be “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Richardson v.  Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 
The statutory term “disability” indicates an “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).  To
determine if a person is “disabled,” the Commissioner applies a five-step sequential
analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920.  If a finding of disability or non-
disability can be made at any step of the sequential analysis, the claim will not be
reviewed further.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a).  Only the first four steps are
4relevant here.  
At step one, the Commissioner will find non-disability unless the claimant shows
that she is not engaged in any “substantial gainful activity.”  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)
and 416.920(b).  If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the
Commissioner will find non-disability at step two unless the claimant shows that she has
a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and
416.920(c).  If a severe impairment or combination of impairments is present, the
Commissioner will consider at step three whether the claimant has an impairment or
combination of impairments which meets or medically equals any impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “Listings”).  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and
416.920(d).  If the claimant’s impairment does meet a listed impairment, then the
claimant is presumptively disabled.  If the claimant’s impairment does not meet a Listed
impairment, then the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s RFC to be used in the fourth
and fifth steps of the evaluation.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),(e) and 416.920(a)(4),(e). 
At step four, the Commissioner will find non-disability unless the claimant demonstrates
that given her RFC she is unable to perform any of her past relevant work.  20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e),(f) and 416.920(e),(f).        
III.
Here, the ALJ applied the standard five-step analysis for evaluating disability
claims.  With regard to step one, the ALJ found that Mirabile had not engaged in
5substantial activity since her alleged onset of disability date.  With regard to step two, the
ALJ found that Mirabile’s bipolar disorder and substance abuse disorder were severe
impairments.  With regard to step three, the ALJ determined that her bipolar disorder and
substance abuse disorder met Listings 12.04A(3)/B(1,2) (bipolar disorder resulting in
marked restriction of activities of daily living and marked difficulties in maintaining
social functioning) and 12.09B (substance addiction disorder leading to depressive
syndrome).  20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.        
However, at step three, the ALJ also determined that Mirabile could not be
considered disabled because her substance abuse was a contributing factor that was
material to her having met the Listings.  In cases involving drug or alcohol addiction,
“[a]n individual shall not be considered to be disabled ... if alcoholism or drug addiction
would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s
determination that the individual is disabled.”  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C).  In assessing
Mirabile’s RFC for purposes of step four and five, the ALJ found that if Mirabile
“stopped the substance use, [she] would have the residual functional capacity to perform
the basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative work on a sustained basis.”  (Joint
App. 18.)  Based on this finding, at step four the ALJ concluded that Mirabile would be
able to perform past relevant work as a bookkeeper, parts manager, and salesperson, and
so found that Mirabile was not disabled.     
The issue on appeal, therefore, is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
6finding that Mirabile’s substance abuse problems were a contributing factor material to
the disability determination.  It is clear that there is substantial evidence to support the
findings both that Mirabile had a substance abuse disorder during the relevant period and
that her substance abuse was a factor that was material to her impairments meeting the
Listings. 
The Social Security Administration advises adjudicators assessing whether an
individual’s substance abuse problems were a factor material to the disability
determination that “[t]he most useful evidence . . . is that relating to a period when the
individual was not using drugs/alcohol.”  Social Security Administration, Questions and
Answers Concerning DAA from the 07/02/96 Teleconference, No. EM-96200 (Aug. 30,
1996).  There is substantial evidence in the record that demonstrates that when Mirabile is
not abusing drugs or alcohol she is capable of working.  All three reports completed by
doctors that are in the record support this finding, and there is no medical evidence in the
record that suggests otherwise.    
First, from March 2nd to March 9th, 2004, Mirabile spent a week at Riverview
Medical Center, during which time she was seen by Dr. Mohammed Hyderi, a staff
psychiatrist.  He reported that Mirabile was “very deep into drugs ... polysubstance
dependent and every chance she gets she uses the drugs ... the patient has had problems
with substance abuse since age 13 to 18.”  (Joint App. 78.)  He also noted, however, that
after going into a rehabilitation facility at eighteen she “came out very successfully” and
7followed that time in the rehabilitation facility with “7 years of sobriety with financially
and socially successful life.”  (Joint App. 78.)  Dr. Hyderi’s report supports the finding
that Mirabile’s substance abuse was a material factor to the disability determination.  He
even concludes his report by noting that “when she is in the good, sober periods, she is
very successful and thoughtful and productive.” (Joint App. 79.)  
Second, on March 15, 2004, Mirabile was admitted to CPC Behavioral Health
Care (“CPC”) for an “intensive outpatient” treatment program for substance abuse issues. 
Her patient type was listed as “Alcohol/Drug Abuser.”  (Joint App. 133.)  Her “primary”
drug was listed as “Marijuana/Hashish” and the admittance report states that she uses her
primary drug daily.  (Joint App. 135.)  Her “secondary” drug is listed as “Crack” and the
report states that she uses it “[l]ess than weekly.”  (Joint App. 135.)  The admission report
also notes that Mirabile had been treated in an emergency room for alcohol or drug
problems in the past 30 days.  (Joint App. 136.)  After this initial admission to the
treatment program, she spent the next seven months in outpatient care through CPC. 
Mirabile was discharged from CPC in November 2004, because, according to CPC’s
Discharge Report, “[n]o continuing substance abuse treatment [was] needed.”  (Joint
App. 138.)  In December 2004, at the end of her period of outpatient treatment through
CPC, she was examined by Dr. Hugh Moore, licensed psychologist.  Dr. Moore noted that
Mirabile had various “symptoms of depression and anxiety.”  (Joint App. 100.)  But he
also found that Mirabile was basically competent to “relate to and interact appropriately
8with others” and that her problems were not “significant enough to interfere with the
claimant’s ability to function on a daily basis.”  (Joint App. 102.)  The fact that Dr. Moore
reported that Mirabile’s mental health issues did not prevent her from interacting
appropriately and functioning on a daily basis–after she had gone through significant drug
rehabilitation–provides support for the finding that Mirabile’s substance abuse was a
material factor to the initial disability determination.  
Finally, the Psychiatric Review Technique and Mental Residual Functional
Capacity Assessment completed by Dr. Janice Drucker in January of 2005, also shortly
after the seven-month stretch of drug rehabilitation, concludes in a similar fashion.  Dr.
Drucker concludes that Mirabile is “not significantly limited” in any of the twenty
different abilities evaluated by the Assessment.  (Joint App. 104-05.)  Dr. Drucker’s
report also provides support for the finding that Mirabile’s substance abuse was a material
factor to the initial disability determination.  
These three doctor reports are the only evidence of record regarding Mirabile’s
level of disability when not using drugs and/or alcohol, and all three provide substantial
support for the finding that her drug abuse is material to the disability determination.  No
medical reports in the record suggest otherwise.  These reports also support the ALJ’s
finding that, absent her substance abuse, Mirabile retained the RFC to perform her past
relevant work.  Given this, it seems clear that there was “substantial evidence” to support
the ALJ’s determination.
9IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will AFFIRM the Order of the District Court.
